Graham Harman‘s most recent article, ”Technology, objects and things in Heidegger,” just published online in the Cambridge Journal of Economics, is another feat of compression in the best traditions of Harmanesque distillation. While in his Heidegger Explained (2007) he had already managed to compress Heidegger’s life’s work into a mere 183 pages, this time Harman summarised Heidegger’s thought in less than 5000 words. While the focus is on Heidegger’s thinking about technology, objects and things, as the title suggests, Harman not only elucidates these concepts but also uses them to interpret Heidegger’s entire philosophy.
As probably the only self-confessed Latourian-Heideggerian philosopher in the universe, Harman’s reading is inevitably coloured by the Latourian side of his brain. While Bruno Latour is not mentioned explicitly in this paper, Harman’s reading of Heidegger here summarises the points that Latour himself often comments on and takes issue with. Therefore this paper could just as well serve as an introduction to the key concerns of actor-network theory, although naturally through some significant modifications, which Harman’s own version of object-oriented philosophy (2002; 2004) also accommodates. For example, there is the dualism between black-boxed tools and broken tools (Latour 2002; 2005b), or the distinction between objects and things (Latour 2004; 2005a), which are recurrent themes in Latour’s work as well.
The point here is not to suggest that there is some kind of a linear, historical continuity between Heidegger and Latour (especially as Latour often defines his position in contrast to that of Heidegger in contestational terms). However, there certainly is a debate between the two traditions, and it is a most interesting one. It concerns Heidegger’s most contentious point, the characterisation of the essence of technology as Gestell, which he sees as challenging the essence of being human. This distinction between humans and nonhumans is a prime target of Latour, and by dissolving it he can melt down Heidegger’s apocalyptic visions. At the same time however actor-network theory could also be seen as enacting the “saving power” that Heidegger sees at the heart of Gestell: ANT could be part of the turning (Heidegger 1977) which is brought about by (the study of) technology itself, and which results in revealing the thinging of things, to paraphrase Heidegger.
This sounds too much like a fairy tale ending though, and as Harman has argued in the last couple years, there are some fundamental metaphysical differences between the Heideggerian “thing” and the Latourian “thing.” So the debate continues. Harman’s forthcoming Prince of Networks book promises to be an important next chapter in the Heideggerian-Latourian story of things, and possibly a bridge of sorts.
References
Harman, G. (2004). Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things. Chicago, Ill., Open Court.
Harman, G. (2007). Heidegger Explained: From Phenomenon to Thing. Peru, IL, Open Court.
Harman, G. (Forthcoming). Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics. Melbourne, re.press.
Harman, G. (2009). “Technology, Objects and Things in Heidegger.” Camb. J. Econ.: bep021.
Harman, G. (2002). Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects. Chicago, Open Court.
Heidegger, M. (1977). “The Turning.” The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. New York; London, Harper and Row: 36-49.
Latour, B. (2005a). “From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik or How to Make Things Public.” In Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy. Ed. by Latour, B. and P. Weibel. Cambridge, Mass. [Karlsruhe, Germany], MIT Press; ZKM/Center for Art and Media in Karlsruhe, pp. 14-41.
Latour, B. (2002). “Morality and Technology: The End of the Means.” Theory, Culture & Society 19(5): 247-60.
Latour, B. (2005b). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. Oxford; New York, Oxford University Press.
Latour, B. (2004). “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern.” Critical Inquiry 30(2): 225-48.
Tags: Cambridge Journal of Economics, equipmentality, Gestell, Heidegger Explained, Kehre, Prince of Networks, tool analysis
31 May 2009 at 6:02 pm |
[...] May 31, 2009 Here’s his take on my Cambridge article at ANTHEM. [...]
26 June 2009 at 11:32 am |
[...] What is not a good thing is the connotation of opaqueness and impenetrability, of which continental philosophy is often accused (probably not unjustifiably). Luckily that is one thing Harman cannot be accused of, and in this sense density was the wrong term to use. Or perhaps it wasn’t after all: as the brilliance of Harman rests exactly in his uncanny ability to render some of the most opaque areas of continental philosophy penetrable again. Just take a look at his condensation of the Heideggerian oeuvre into 183 pages in his Heidegger Explained, or his recent summary of Heiddegger on technology. [...]
10 August 2009 at 9:32 pm |
[...] blogg. Det här inlägget behandlar en artikel om Heidegger som han skrev tidigare i år som heter “Technology, Objects and Things in Heidegger” och summerar hans tidigare Heidegger-reflektioner som också ligger till grund för de aktuella [...]
16 January 2010 at 11:49 pm |
[...] about Heidegger’s take on technology, which really intrigued me at the time. Here are my initial ruminations on Harman’s article from May 2009. Needless to say, this Cambridge J. Econ. special issue is [...]
2 April 2010 at 1:05 pm |
[...] Leave a Comment I get the feeling that Graham Harman is the key to my lack of understanding, http://anthem-group.net/2009/05/31/heideggers-ontology-of-technology/ - this audio lecture provides a good explanation of Heideggarian thought and an essential [...]
28 August 2010 at 5:02 pm |
PE;
You write as if there is a subject/object world. There is no subject/object world.
I invite you to read my recently posted blog “The ‘Leap’” at http://beyondheidegger.blogspot.com. It might clear a few things up for you, add to any confusion you may have, or you may not have any time to read it. Read it anyway, I think you will enjoy it.