Question:

Michel Callon argues that the model of economic man could be useful for people engaging in economic activities. And that the interesting thing about this model is if it is actually used by economic actors. Do you agree with that argument?

Answer:

If Callon says that I would say: Why do they use it? I would ask: What kind of properties should this variety of models have? This is not the kind of question he can answer. He would just answer that they do use it. I think that the problem with this answer is that it will lack a reflection on this architecture of regimes and on the path to the public. This is the main problem for me with this overwhelming notion of network. It doesn’t give any specification of the link, of the social link, of the social action. And again I think a good specification would require this specification both of the good and of the reality as it is used as a test. Instead of that the network modelling in general terms is, I would say, flat, so it cannot give you a good picture of what is needed to go from proximity to the public and to come back from there.

Callon’s essay, “Economic Markets and the Rise of Interactive Agencements” in Pinch and Swedberg’s 2008 book, Living In a Material World, reads like a reply to this challenge, as he develops exactly what Thévenot seems to be asking for. Callon defends his notion of homo economicus 2.0 (also discussed elsewhere) by developing a conceptual framework that allows him not only to describe the conditions for the emergence of such calculative individual agency and its characteristics but also to present some normative considerations for political action. In the process he also manages to revitalise actor-network theory for the study of economic phenomena.

It is an interesting and even unusual article for a number of reasons. Rather than dismissing the rational and independent homo economicus of neo-classical economics in favour of an embedded and networked homo sociologicus, Callon argues that some form of calculative individual agency does exist and that the role of economic sociology is to describe the conditions, the support systems, which enable  this creature (homo economicus 2.0) to be performed. To accomplish this task, Callon builds a conceptual apparatus that draws on Hutchins’ theory of distributed cognition, Deleuze’s notion of agencement, Foucault’s notion of dispositif, and Barry’s notion of interactive diagram (after Deleuze and Guattari) – and of course actor-network theory.

While proponents of actor-network theory sometimes dismiss the agency-structure problem in social theory as a non-issue, Callon tackles it head on by proposing to abandon the focus on actors and actants in favour of agency and distributed action instead, in order to avoid the aforementioned bifurcation. Such a move is necessary because the aim of the paper is to investigate perhaps the most contentious issue for ANT: the problem of individual agency, in this case of homo economicus.

After Barry, Callon characterises the contemporary mode of economic ordering as an interactive diagram, kept stable by socio-technical agencements that are primarily made up of discourses, procedures and information and communication technologies. He demonstrates two dominant types of diagrams – interactive diagrams and disciplinary diagrams – through a case study of a breakdown of homo economicus 2.0, namely the case of people with disabilities. Callon identifies two different ways in which disabled people are enabled within the contemporary network economy: they are either equipped with prostheses (and thus get caught up in a disciplining diagram) or their socio-technical agencement is modified (within the interactive diagram), allowing them to pursue their projects in line with the entrepreneurial imperative of homo economicus 2.0.

Callon comes down in favour of the latter approach for political action (which he calls ‘habilitation policy,’ in contrast to ‘prosthetic policy’), as a solution to address the problems of overflows (negative externalities) of the dominant form of economic ordering  (which produces homo economicus 2.0). These overflows would concern those human beings who find themselves excluded from the interactive, entrepreneurial becoming that is presently valued and encouraged in Western societies, simply because they are not equipped with the appropriate tools and/or do not have access to the requisite socio-technical agencements.

References

Barry, A. (2001). Political Machines: Governing a Technological Society. London, Athlone.

Callon, M. (2008). Economic Markets and the Rise of Interactive Agencements: From Prosthetic Agencies to Habilitated Agencies. Living in a Material World: Economic Sociology Meets Science and Technology Studies. T. J. Pinch and R. Swedberg. Cambridge, Mass.; London, MIT: 29-56.

Jagd, S. (2004). “The French Convention School and the Coordination of Economic Action: Laurent Thévenot Interviewed by Søren Jagd at the EHESS Paris.” Economic Sociology: European Electronic Newsletter 5(3): 10-16.

Two important consequences ensue for a philosophy of apparatuses. The first is the repudiation of universals. A universal explains nothing; it, on the other hand, must be explained. All of the lines are lines of variation that do not even have constant coordinates. The One, the Whole, the True, the object, the subject are not universals but singular processes of unification, totalization, verification, objectification, subjectivation immanent to an apparatus. Each apparatus is therefore a multiplicity where certain processes in becoming are operative and are distinct from those operating in another apparatus.

(…)

The second result of a philosophy of apparatuses is a change in orientation, turning away from the Eternal to apprehend the new. The new is not supposed to designate fashion, but on the contrary the variable creativity for the apparatuses: in conformance with the question that began to appear in the 20th century of how the production of something new in the world is possible. (pp. 347-349)

Deleuze, G. and D. Lapoujade (2007). “What is a Dispositif?” Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews, 1975-1995. New York, Semiotext(e) ; London : MIT Press [distributor].  pp. 343-352

I shall call an apparatus literally anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings. (p. 14)

Agamben calls the process of producing human subjects by apparatuses subjectification.

So, once more, is subjectification by apparatuses good or bad? In Heidegger’s view, the apparatus (technology that has the character of enframing, Gestell) is dangerous because it threatens the essence of being human. Foucault seems to be cagier about this issue but Agamben appears to side with Heidegger when he classifies beings like this:

To recapitulate, we have then two great classes: living beings (substances) and apparatuses. And between these two, as a third class, subjects. I call a subject that which results from the relation and, so to speak, from the relentless fight between living beings and apparatuses. (…) The boundless growth of apparatuses in our time corresponds to the equally extreme proliferation in processes of subjectification. (p. 14-15)

Proponents of actor-network theory reject such a priori distinctions between human and nonhuman objects. The result of such a move changes the question itself. It is no longer interesting to ask, ‘Are apparatuses as such inherently good or bad?’ Instead, the question becomes, ‘ What is this or that particular apparatus made for? Is it well made or poorly designed?’ As for subjects, they are constructed, period. If everything is constructed, the prospect of subjectification is no longer horrifying. It is simply a matter of fact. In turn, the question of ‘How subjects are constructed by apparatuses?’ becomes extremely interesting.

Edgar Whitley’s recent video about the UK Identity Card Scheme provides an excellent example for this. As Whitley argues, the problem is not with the idea of using a card for identifying citizens but with the way the scheme, i.e. this apparatus, had been designed. While the ID card scheme does have a user-centric design, the problem is it centres on the wrong user:  the government, instead of the citizen.

The making of this scheme has to be put under the closest scrutiny precisely because the ID card is an apparatus of subjectification, a tool for producing a particular kind of citizen. Thankfully the LSE’s Identity Project has been fulfilling exactly that function. However, its message needs to be disseminated and heard more widely. As Whitley puts it, ID cards threaten to change the relationship between the individual and the state in the UK, by producing a new kind of citizen, and a new kind of state.

So, is an apparatus good or bad? It is bad only if you use Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology” as a blueprint, a user’s manual (as the current UK government appears to be doing), rather than a thought-provoking meditation that kicked off a fascinating debate about the relationship between human beings and their tools. As science and technology studies have shown in the past 30 years or so, that relationship is much more complicated than anyone expected.

References

Agamben, G. (2009). “What is an apparatus?” and other essays. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press.

Heidegger, M. (1977). The question concerning technology and other essays. New York; London, Harper and Row.

“What Is an Apparatus?” and Other Essays, by Giorgio Agamben. Translated by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella. Published by Stanford University Press in 2009.

At a fundamental level the essay is ‘simply’ an exposition of Michel Foucault’s concept of the apparatus (dispositif), by way of a genealogy  of the term. This turns out to be a most fascinating exercise that not only illuminates this crucially important Foucauldian insight but also redefines the relationship between contemporary forms of (social, technical and economic) ordering and the workings of the early Christian Church. Agamben accomplishes this by tracing the history of the term dispositif in Foucault’s work back to his teacher Jean Hyppolite’s interpretation of Hegel’s notion of positivity (Positivität). Hegel’s discussion of the “positivity of religion” then leads Agamben to the use of the Latin term dispositio by the early Church Fathers, which turns out to be a translation of the Greek oikonomia.

Agamben argues that Foucault’s apparatus has its origins in Christian theology, more specifically in the debate surrounding the problem of the Trinity. Essentially the arrangement of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit required the notion of the apparatus to help explain (and institute) the translation and administration of God’s will by way of a divine economy of agents (including Christ, “the man of economy”). Through this remarkable train of thought Agamben manages to execute not only an explication of Foucault’s thought but also a genealogy of contemporary capitalism. Perhaps most of all this essay is an exercise in economic sociology (without wanting to take away from its philosophical merits).

From an ANTHEM (i.e. actor-network theory vis-a-vis Heidegger) perspective, this essay also establishes Foucault as the definitive link between ANT and Heidegger, through the common concern with apparatuses and their enframing (or Ge-stell, to use Heidegger’s term). (A similar point has also been made by Alain Pottage at last year’s “A Turn to Ontology?” event at Oxford.)

Agamben’s own deployment of the concept of the apparatus for describing the process of subjectification (i.e. the configuring of human subjects), however fascinating, ends up building on Heidegger’s darker vision of technology, making a definite distinction between humans and artefacts, in contrast to ANT’s principle of generalised symmetry. For this reason, readers of Callon, Latour, Law et al. will probably find Agamben’s own conclusions about the nature of contemporary capitalism less compelling, as the separation of devices from the humans inevitably leads to a particular type of critique.

Still, Agamben’s analysis is hugely enlightening and inspiring, and it will undoubtedly generate some interesting and timely debates. One would of course need to be an expert at least in Foucault, Hegel and early Church history (not to mention the languages involved) to be able to verify or challenge Agamben’s account. However, even in the absence of such an apparatus, one cannot fail to be impressed and stimulated by the unique series of translations that Agamben performs in this essay, in 24 pages of accessible prose.

Abstract

Devising Affectedness: Eco-Homes and the Making of Material Publics

By Noortje Marres

In this talk, I approach the eco-home as a special kind of device of publicity, one that is now being deployed to materially organise pubic involvement with the environment. What stands out from this perspective are the capacities of domestic appliances, like water cookers, electricity meters and heat pumps, for affectively engaging their users in issues of energy use, climate change, and the sustainable economy. These technologies, which are both informational and material, can be said to enable a particular redefinition of public involvement: IT must now be understood in terms of the socio-material implication of domestic subjects in the proliferation of green issues.

In this respect, different theoretical understandings of “affective politics” can be seen to intersect in the eco-home. Post-Foucauldian perspectives on the emotive enrolment of subjects are equally relevant to it as materialist conceptions of the political community in terms of “those who are jointly affected by issues.” However, eco-homes can also be seen to challenge these understandings, to the extent that they activate the experimentalist question, “Are you capable of being affected?” From this standpoint, what deserves special attention are the ambivalences that are currently being built into the eco-home: it serves both as an instrument of the materialization of environmental citizenship, and is a factor in the virtualization of the issue of climate change. In this context, finally, questions can be raised about the affective capacities of social theory itself, in terms of its own responsiveness to the challenges posed by green issues.

Biography

Noortje Marres is a Marie Curie Research Fellow at the Sociology Department, Goldsmiths, University of London. Having been trained in science and technology studies, her current research is concerned with material technologies of politics, as deployed in the context of climate change. She received her PhD in Philosophy from the University of Amsterdam, and conducted part of her doctoral research at the Ecole des Mines in Paris. Her thesis was about (neo-)pragmatist theories of democracy and technology, and, drawing on this work, she has published several articles on issue-oriented concepts of the public.

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The Information Systems Research Forum (ISRF) is a seminar series focusing on recent advances in research broadly relating to information and communication systems. ISRF is organized by research students of the Information Systems and Innovation Group (ISIG) at LSE. While our Group’s research focus can be described as the social study of ICTs and innovation, ISRF aims to involve speakers from different backgrounds in a cross-disciplinary discussion and debate.

This term’s seminar series has been organised by Aleksi Aaltonen, Ofer Engel and Peter Erdélyi.

Please note places will be available on a first-come-first-serve basis – registration is not required. The event will take place in Studio Ciborra, 5th floor, Tower One, Clements Inn.